# P2P Network

We instantiate a `p2p` network and call `start()`. This will begin running a single
p2p network until `stop()` is called.

There are 3 session types:

* `InboundSession`, concerned with incoming connections
* `OutboundSession`, concerned with outgoing connections
* `SeedSession` is a special session type which connects to seed nodes to populate
  the hosts pool, then finishes once synced.

Connections are made by either `Acceptor` or `Connector` for incoming or outgoing
respectively. They have multiple transport types; see `src/net/transport/` for the
full list.

Connections are then wrapped in a `Channel` abstraction which allows
protocols to be attached. See `src/net/protocol/` and run `fd protocol` for custom
application specific network protocols. Also see the follow tutorial:

* [Understanding Protocols](learn/dchat/creating-dchat/protocols.md)

## Outbound Session

The outbound session is responsible to ensure the hosts pool is populated, either
through currently connected nodes or using the seed session.
It performs this algorithm:

1. Start $N$ slots, and a sleeping peer discovery process

Then each slot performs this algorithm:

1. If no addresses matching our filters are in the hosts pool then:
    1. Wakeup the peer discovery process. This does nothing if peer discovery is already active.
    2. Peer discovery tries first 2 times to poll the current network if there are connected nodes,
       otherwise it will do a seed server sync.
    3. Peer discovery then wakes any sleeping slots and goes back to sleep.

## Security

### Design Considerations

* Mitigate attacks to a reasonable degree. Ensuring complete coverage against attacks is infeasible and likely
  introduces significant latency into protocols.
* Primarily target the p2p network running over anonymity networks like Tor, i2p or Nym.
  This means we cannot rely on node addresses being reliable. Even on the clearnet, attackers can easily obtain
  large numbers of proxy addresses.

The main attacks are:

* **Sybil attack**. A malicious actor tries to subvert the network using sockpuppet nodes. For example
  false signalling using version messages on the p2p network.
* **Eclipse attack**. Targets a single node, through a p2p MitM attack where the malicious actor controls all
  the traffic you see. For example they might send you a payment, then want to doublespend without you
  knowing about it.
* **Denial of Service**. Usually happens when a node is overloaded by too much data being sent.

### Common Mitigations

* **Backoff/falloff**. This is the strategy implemented in Bitcoin. This can be bad when arbitrary limits are implemented
  since we slow down traffic for no reason.
* **Choking controller**. BitTorrent no longer uses naive tit-for-tat, instead libtorrent implements an anti-leech seeding algo
  from the paper [Improving BitTorrent: A Simple Approach](https://qed.usc.edu/papers/ChowGM08.pdf), which is focused on distributing
  bandwidth to all peers. See also [libtorrent/src/choker.cpp](https://github.com/arvidn/libtorrent/blob/RC_2_0/src/choker.cpp).
    * All p2p messages will have a score which represents workload for the node. There is a hard limit, and in general the choker
      will try to balance the scores between all available channels.
    * Opening the connection itself has a score with inbound connections assigned more cost than outgoing ones.
* **Smart ban**. Malicious peers which violate protocols are hard banned. For example sending the wrong data for a chunk.
    * Add a method `channel.ban()` which immediately disconnects and blacklists the address.
* **uTP congestion control**. BitTorrent implements a UDP protocol with its own congestion control. We could do such a similar strategy
  with the addition of removing ordering. This reduces protocol latency mitigating attacks. See [libtorrent.org/utp.html](https://libtorrent.org/utp.html)
  for more info.
    * Maybe less important if we use alternative networks like Tor or i2p.
* **White, gray and black lists**. See section 2.2 of [Exploring the Monero P2P Network](https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/411.pdf) for
  details of this algorithm. This aids with network connectivity, avoiding netsplits which could make the network more susceptible to
  eclipse/sybil attacks (large scale MiTM).
    * For this we would need a function to connect to a host, send a ping, receive a pong and disconnect to test node connectivity.
* **Protocol-level reputation system**. You have a keypair, which accrues more trust from the network. Nodes gossip trust metrics.
    * See [AnonRep: Towards Tracking-Resistant Anonymous Reputation](https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/nsdi16/nsdi16-paper-zhai.pdf)
    * Also the discussion in
      [Semaphore RLN, rate limiting nullifier for spam prevention in anonymous p2p setting](https://ethresear.ch/t/semaphore-rln-rate-limiting-nullifier-for-spam-prevention-in-anonymous-p2p-setting/5009)
* **Reduce blast radius**. The p2p subsystem should run on its own dedicated executor, separate from database lookups or other
  system operations.
* **fail2ban**
* **Optimized blockchain database**. Most databases are written for interleaved reads and writes as well as deletion. Blockchains follow
  a different pattern of infrequent writes being mostly append-only, and requiring weaker guarantees.

### Protocol Suggestions

Core protocols should be modeled and analyzed with DoS protections added. Below are suggestions to start the investigation.

* Do not forward orphan txs or blocks.
* Drop all double spend txs.
    * Alternatively require a higher fee if we want to enable replace by fee.
    * Do not forward double spend txs.
* Do not forward the same object (block, transaction .etc) to the same peer twice. Violation results in `channel.ban()`.
* Very low fee txs are rate limited.
* Limit orphan txs.
* Drop large or unusual orphan transactions to limit damage.
* Consider a verification cache to prevent attacks that try to trigger re-verification of stored orphan txs. Also limit the size of the cache.
  See [Fixed vulnerability explanation: Why the signature cache is a DoS protection.](https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=136422.0)
* Perform more expensive checks later in tx validation.
* Nodes will only relay valid transactions with a certain fee amount. More expensive transactions require a higher fee.
* Complex operations such as requesting data can be mitigated by tracking the number of requests from a peer.
    * Attackers may attempt flooding invs for invalid data. The peer responds with get data but that object doesn't exist using
      up precious bandwidth. Limit both the rate of invs to 2/s and size of items to 35.
    * Also loops can cause an issue if triggered by the network. This should be carefully analyzed and flattened if possible,
      otherwise they should be guarded against attack.

### Customizable Policy

Apps should be able to configure:

* Reject hosts, for example based off current overall resource utilization or the host addr.
* Accounting abstraction for scoring connections.

