Эх сурвалжийг харах

[doc/architecture/blockchain] added inverse lead selection function

mohab 4 жил өмнө
parent
commit
088ada9ff7

+ 43 - 7
doc/src/architecture/blockchain.md

@@ -68,8 +68,10 @@ the probability that a party holding all the stake will be selected to
 be a leader. Stakeholder is selected as leader for slot j with
 be a leader. Stakeholder is selected as leader for slot j with
 probability $\phi_f(\alpha_i)$, $\alpha_i$ is $U_i$ stake.
 probability $\phi_f(\alpha_i)$, $\alpha_i$ is $U_i$ stake.
 
 
+### absolute stake aggregation dependent leader selection functions
+
+#### linear functions
 
 
-### linear aggregation dependent leader selection
 in the previous leader selection function, it has the unique property of
 in the previous leader selection function, it has the unique property of
 independent aggregation of the stakes, meaning the property of a leader winning leadership with stakes $\sigma$ is independent of whether the stakeholder would act as a pool of stakes, or distributed stakes on competing coins.
 independent aggregation of the stakes, meaning the property of a leader winning leadership with stakes $\sigma$ is independent of whether the stakeholder would act as a pool of stakes, or distributed stakes on competing coins.
 "one minus the probability" of winning leadership with aggregated stakes is
 "one minus the probability" of winning leadership with aggregated stakes is
@@ -80,13 +82,15 @@ $\prod_{i}^{n}(1-\phi(\sigma_i))=-(1-f)^{\sum_i(\sigma_i)}$
 thus:
 thus:
 $$ 1-\phi(\sum_{i}\sigma_i) =\prod_{i}^{n}(1-\phi(\sigma_i)) $$
 $$ 1-\phi(\sum_{i}\sigma_i) =\prod_{i}^{n}(1-\phi(\sigma_i)) $$
 
 
-#### linear leader selection
+##### linear leader selection
+
 $$y < T $$
 $$y < T $$
 $$y = 2^lk \mid 0 \le k \le 1$$
 $$y = 2^lk \mid 0 \le k \le 1$$
 $$T = 2^l\phi(v)$$
 $$T = 2^l\phi(v)$$
 $$ \phi(v)=\frac{1}{v_{max}}v $$
 $$ \phi(v)=\frac{1}{v_{max}}v $$
 
 
-#### dependent aggregation
+##### dependent aggregation
+
 linear leader selection has the dependent aggregation property, meaning it's favorable to compete in pools with sum of the stakes over aggregated stakes of distributed stakes:
 linear leader selection has the dependent aggregation property, meaning it's favorable to compete in pools with sum of the stakes over aggregated stakes of distributed stakes:
 
 
 $$\phi(\sum_{i}{\sigma_i})>\prod_{i}^{n}{\sigma_i}$$
 $$\phi(\sum_{i}{\sigma_i})>\prod_{i}^{n}{\sigma_i}$$
@@ -95,17 +99,49 @@ let's assume the stakes are divided to stakes of value $\sigma_i=1$ for $\Sigma>
 $$V>(\frac{1}{v_{max}})^{n-1}$$
 $$V>(\frac{1}{v_{max}})^{n-1}$$
 note that $(\frac{1}{v_{max}})^{n-1} < 1, V>1$, thus competing with single coin of the sum of stakes held by the stakeholder is favourable.
 note that $(\frac{1}{v_{max}})^{n-1} < 1, V>1$, thus competing with single coin of the sum of stakes held by the stakeholder is favourable.
 
 
-### scalar linear aggregation dependent leader selection
+##### scalar linear aggregation dependent leader selection
+
   a target function T with scalar coefficients can be formalized as
   a target function T with scalar coefficients can be formalized as
  $$T=2^lk\phi(\Sigma)=2^l(\frac{1}{v_{max}})\Sigma$$
  $$T=2^lk\phi(\Sigma)=2^l(\frac{1}{v_{max}})\Sigma$$
  let's assume $v_{max}=2^v$, then:
  let's assume $v_{max}=2^v$, then:
  $$T=2^lk\phi(\Sigma)=2^{l-v}\Sigma$$
  $$T=2^lk\phi(\Sigma)=2^{l-v}\Sigma$$
  then the lead statement is
  then the lead statement is
- $$y<2^{l-v}\Sigma$$ for example for a group order or l=24 bits, and maximum value of $v_{max}=2^{10}$, then lead statement:
+ $$y<2^{l-v}\Sigma$$ for example for a group order or l=    24 bits, and maximum value of $v_{max}=2^{10}$, then lead statement:
  $$y<2^{14}\Sigma$$
  $$y<2^{14}\Sigma$$
 
 
-### pairing leader selection independent aggregation function
-TODO
+##### competing max value coins
+
+for a stakeholder with $nv_{max}$ absolute stake, $\mid n \in \mathbb{Z}$ it's advantageous for the stakeholder to
+distribute stakes on $n$ competing coins.
+
+
+#### inverse functions
+
+inverse lead selection functions doesn't require maximum stake, most suitable for absolute stake,
+it has the disadvantage that it's inflating with increasing rate as time goes on , but it can be function of the inverse of the slot
+to control the increasing frequency of winning leadership.
+
+##### leader selection without maximum stake upper limit
+
+the inverse leader selection without maximum stake value can be $\phi(v)=\frac{v}{v+c}$  where c is $ > 1$
+and inversely proportional with probability of winning leadership, let it be called leadership coefficient.
+
+
+##### decaying linear leader selection
+
+as the time goes one, and stakes increase, this means the combined stakes of all stakeholders increases the probability
+of winning leadership in next slots leading to more leaders at a single slot, to maintain, or to be more general to control this frequency of leaders per slot,
+c (the leadership coefficient) need to be function of the slot $sl$, i.e $c(sl) = \frac{sl}{R}$ where $R$ is epoch size (number of slots in epoch).
+
+##### pairing leader selection independent aggregation function
+
+the only family of functions that are isomorphic to summation on multiplication (having the independent aggregation property) is the exponential function,
+and since it's impossible to implement in plonk,
+
+###### TODO (proof)
+
+a re-formalization of the lead statement using pairing that is isomorphic to summation on multiplication is also an options.
+
 
 
 ## Leaky non-resettable beacon
 ## Leaky non-resettable beacon
 
 

BIN
doc/src/architecture/blockchain.pdf