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- /* This file is part of DarkFi (https://dark.fi)
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2020-2026 Dyne.org foundation
- *
- * This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as
- * published by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the
- * License, or (at your option) any later version.
- *
- * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
- * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
- * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
- * GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
- *
- * You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
- * along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
- */
- //! Taken from https://docs.rs/ockam_vault/latest/src/ockam_vault/xeddsa.rs.html
- //! XEdDSA according to <https://signal.org/docs/specifications/xeddsa/#xeddsa>
- use curve25519_dalek::{
- constants::ED25519_BASEPOINT_TABLE,
- montgomery::MontgomeryPoint,
- scalar::{clamp_integer, Scalar},
- };
- use digest::Digest;
- use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, VerifyingKey as Ed25519PublicKey};
- use sha2::Sha512;
- use x25519_dalek::{PublicKey as X25519PublicKey, StaticSecret as X25519SecretKey};
- pub trait XeddsaSigner {
- fn xeddsa_sign(&self, msg: &[u8], nonce: &[u8; 64]) -> [u8; 64];
- }
- pub trait XeddsaVerifier {
- fn xeddsa_verify(&self, msg: &[u8], nonce: &[u8; 64]) -> bool;
- }
- impl XeddsaSigner for X25519SecretKey {
- fn xeddsa_sign(&self, msg: &[u8], nonce: &[u8; 64]) -> [u8; 64] {
- //
- // PREPARATION OF THE KEY MATERIAL
- //
- // This algorithm to sign data using a Curve25519 keypair has to
- // tackle two issues. The first issue is that the conversion of
- // a Curve25519 public key to an Ed25519 public key is not unique
- // when only having access to the u coordinate of the Curve25519
- // public key, which is the case with the serialization format
- // commonly used. In fact the conversion is unique by the sign of
- // the Ed25519 public key x coordinate. This signing algorithm
- // "solves" the problem by modifying the private key so that the
- // sign of the resulting Ed25519 public key is always zero.
- // x25519-dalek private keys are already clamped, so just compute
- // the Ed25519 public key from the Curve25519 private key.
- let scalar_k = Scalar::from_bytes_mod_order(clamp_integer(self.to_bytes()));
- let edward_point = ED25519_BASEPOINT_TABLE * &scalar_k;
- let mut compressed_edwards = edward_point.compress();
- let sign = compressed_edwards.0[31] >> 7;
- // Set the sign bit to zero after adjusting the private key
- compressed_edwards.0[31] &= 0x7F; // A.s = 0
- // Compute the negative secret key
- // If the sign bit of the calculated Ed25519 public key is zero,
- // the private key doesn't have to be touched. If the sign bit
- // is one, the private key has to be inverted prior to using it.
- let k = if sign == 1 { -scalar_k } else { scalar_k };
- //
- // SIGNING
- //
- // The second problem this algorithm has to tackle is that
- // Ed25519 signature algorithms don't use the private scalar
- // directly, but rather use a seed to derive other data from.
- // To create signatures compatible with Ed25519, a modified
- // version of the signing algorithm is required that does not
- // depend on a seed.
- // r = hash1(a || M || Z) (mod q)
- let mut hash_padding = [0xff, 32];
- hash_padding[0] = 0xfe;
- let mut hasher = Sha512::new();
- hasher.update(hash_padding);
- hasher.update(k.as_bytes());
- hasher.update(msg);
- hasher.update(nonce.as_ref());
- let r = Scalar::from_hash(hasher);
- // R = rB
- let cap_r = (ED25519_BASEPOINT_TABLE * &r).compress();
- // h = hash(R || A || M) (mod q)
- hasher = Sha512::new();
- hasher.update(cap_r.as_bytes());
- hasher.update(compressed_edwards.as_bytes());
- hasher.update(msg);
- let h = Scalar::from_hash(hasher);
- // s = r + ha (mod q)
- let s = r + h * k;
- // return R || s
- let mut sig = [0u8; 64];
- sig[..32].copy_from_slice(cap_r.as_bytes());
- sig[32..].copy_from_slice(s.as_bytes());
- sig
- }
- }
- impl XeddsaVerifier for X25519PublicKey {
- fn xeddsa_verify(&self, msg: &[u8], sig: &[u8; 64]) -> bool {
- let pt = MontgomeryPoint(self.to_bytes());
- if let Some(edwards) = pt.to_edwards(0) {
- let pk = Ed25519PublicKey::from_bytes(&edwards.compress().to_bytes()).unwrap();
- let signature = Signature::from_bytes(sig);
- return pk.verify_strict(msg, &signature).is_ok()
- }
- false
- }
- }
- #[cfg(test)]
- mod tests {
- use super::*;
- use rand::rngs::OsRng;
- #[test]
- fn xeddsa_test() {
- let nonce = [0u8; 64];
- let msg = [0u8; 200];
- let xsecret_key = X25519SecretKey::new(&mut OsRng);
- let xpublic_key = X25519PublicKey::from(&xsecret_key);
- let sig = xsecret_key.xeddsa_sign(&msg, &nonce);
- assert!(xpublic_key.xeddsa_verify(&msg, &sig));
- }
- }
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